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1 Introduction and summary 
Developments in real house prices differed substantially across OECD countries over the 
period 1975-2012. In the majority of OECD countries, real house prices have been moving up 
over the last decades. As can be seen in Figure 1 below where we have plotted the real house 
prices for 11 OECD countries, some countries, such as Ireland, Luxembourg and Australia, 
experienced protracted price appreciations while other countries prices were more stable over 
time, such as Germany. Most countries prices display a cyclical pattern, some more than 
others, as the cases of Spain and Italy. The weighted aggregate for 21 OECD countries 
portraits an upward trend until the financial crisis started about 2007, with one additional 
apparent break in this trend around year 1991 (bottom right panel in figure 1).  
The consequences of the collapses of the housing markets for the real economy in many 
countries in both the 1990’s and 2007/2008 cases have been severe. When homeownership-
rates are high and households are highly leveraged, increases in systemic risk can bear 
consequences for large parts of the population. There are non-trivial differences in the 
homeownership-rates across OECD countries. At the high end of the scale are Spain and the 
UK (83.2 and 70.7 percent were homeowners in 2004, respectively (OECD numbers)), while 
at the low end were Germany and Switzerland (only 41 and 38.4 percent owned a home). One 
would thus expect busts to affect a broader part of the population in the high end countries, 
leading to adverse effects among different segments of the population.  
Using different econometric approaches and based on a panel of 21 OECD countries this 
thesis investigate whether differences in structural or policy factors significantly affects the 
price responsiveness of shocks to demand in the short run and in the cases of abrupt 
movements in real prices. Over such steeper areas of the housing cycle the analysis focus 
specifically on finding evidence of asymmetric responses of demand and structural factors on 
price dynamics. The study of asymmetries in the overall business cycle is a well-developed 
field in econometric analysis but, to my knowledge, no such efforts are put into the study of 
housing cycles. This thesis will not go into the concept of over-evaluation or misalignments in 
the housing market, which are related concepts.  
Catte et al. (2004) investigate the relationship between house prices and the overall business 
cycle for OECD countries between 1975 and 2004. They find that property markets tend to 
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track the business cycle, with a tendency for real house price turning points to lag business 
cycle peaks. This pro-cyclical nature of housing prices has led others to study the feedback 
effects to the macro economy from both consumption and wealth effects. When consumers 
have an infinite planning horizon, sharp increases in prices today may lead to an increase in 
consumers’ current valuation of permanent income (Friedman 1957), leading to increased 
borrowing today in order to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. Moreover, housing 
wealth can facilitate access to credit for liquidity-constrained households (Catte et al. 2004 
p.14). Higher prices also stimulate investment in new dwellings, depending on the elasticity 
of supply in the respective country.  
This thesis is inspired by new insights on the connections between shocks to demand, 
structural and policy factors and the effect on house price dynamics and the work done by 
Andrews (2010) in particular, as well as the idea of asymmetries over the business cycle. In 
certain respects the analysis borrows heavily from choices of structural factors and shocks to 
deem relevant for housing demand from Andrews. Also, the aim is to bring something new to 
the table. Whereas Andrews consider long term determinants of prices and overall volatility, I 
use a similar framework to consider short term dynamics of prices as well as medium term 
periods when prices have risen or fallen abruptly (booms and busts) separately. I have also 
built a richer dataset for 21 OECD countries between 1975 and 2012. Some alternative 
econometric approaches will also be discussed.  
I find evidence of different influential driving factors involved for a simple predictor of large 
house price falls and large house price increases. The existence of asymmetries in the driving 
factors behind housing cycles could make demand relations dependent on a sort of switching 
regime, in which case any prediction problem become a nonlinear one. This would evidently 
affect empirical results based on symmetric models. In a symmetric short term price dynamics 
model these results indicate the income elasticity of housing prices decrease if the degree of 
banking supervision is high. However, evaluating periods of large movements in prices, this 
effect dissipates in periods of booms and increases the risk of a bust. Moreover, according to 
these estimates, rigidities in supply is an important driving factor in a booming period but not 
influential during periods of a bust.  
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Considering contraction periods only, an in-sample forecasting model of price falls in a 
similar framework as the more contemporaneous models discussed in the previous section is 
estimated. Evaluating the models’ predictive abilities at historical episodes of large price falls, 
the risk probabilities are in all but a couple of cases much higher than the country specific 
average at the eve of a bust. For Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands (’79 case) and the 
US (’79 case) the calculated probabilities are between 2.5-3.2 standard deviations away from 
their respective means.  
Authors at the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) have recently (2013) compiled a 
monthly database for policy actions on mortgage and housing markets for numerous countries 
between 1990 and 2012. With the luxury of hindsight, the overall impression after reading 
through the various policy actions is that many measures were taken subsequent to a recent 
downfall in the housing market or when the private sector were especially highly leveraged. 
This could suggest a “leaning against the wind”-attitude towards build-ups in both markets. 
Of course, policy makers often face a trade-off between acting towards such build-ups and at 
times conflicting goals such as battling unemployment or securing the competitiveness of the 
exporting sector.  
The linkage of the housing market to the real economy, the business cycle and the potentially 
adverse consequences of a bust calls for attention towards the determinants of house price 
dynamics, both in the short, the medium and in the long run. There has been a newborn focus 
on structural and policy factors’ effects on real housing prices among especially OECD 
economists (see inter alia Andrews 2010 and OECD Economic Policy Reforms 2011). If 
there is an accelerator mechanism present in housing markets (Bernanke 1996), knowledge of 
which policy measures or structural reform dampens an upswing and mitigates a downturn is 
warranted. And if there are asymmetric driving factors over the housing cycle, this would call 
for differences in responses.  
The organization of the thesis is as follows; Section 2 discusses theory of price formation and 
develops a model for the housing market. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 lays out the 
econometric approach and estimation results for short term price dynamics with some 
extensions. Section 5 consider large price movements and proposes some simple cut-off 
values for booms and busts and estimation results with a particular focus on abrupt price falls. 
At last we summarize some main findings in section 6.  
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Figure 1.1 Log real house prices by country 1975-2012. Index: 2005=100 
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2 Theory of the housing market 
This section presents a model of the housing market using the concept of general equilibrium 
that will form the theoretical basis for the analysis in the rest of this thesis. I then turn to 
review some theory of determinants of housing demand and supply and their possible linkage 
with structural country factors. It will also be clarified what variables that is used in the 
econometric analysis and their interpretation.  
2.1 A model of the housing market 
The theoretical equilibrium framework adopted is inspired by the stock-flow model of the 
housing market as described by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992) and Sanchez and Johansson 
(2011). Let       be a vector of exogenous demand side factors such as income, structural 
factors, the user cost of holding the housing asset and demographic characteristics and let 
  the real price of housing. These concepts will be clarified in more detail later. Assume the 
demand for housing  ( )        determines the equilibrium real price that will clear the 
finite stock of housing S    for the owner-occupied housing market in the long run 
 (   )       ∫  ( )  
 
   
  (1) 
, where     is an arbitrary date in the past. The housing stock is assumed similar in quality. 
On the supply side, the stock of housing slowly depreciates over time, at a rate      and 
increases with new housing investments I, which depend on cost shifters Y    such as 
demographic factors and the costs of production and on real house prices P: 
    (   )       (2) 
Assume demand for housing consumption  ( ) is approximately continuous and monotone in 
each of its arguments (a consequence of this assumption is flexible prices which rules out e.g. 
inertia in prices). Also assume the initial dwelling stock  ( ) is predetermined.  
Then inverting (1)  
      
  (      )     
   (1)’ 
Any observed period t real price can be expressed as a function of demand side factors given 
the housing stock in place and an error term. If (1) determines the long term equilibrium price 
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the error term in (1)’ can be interpreted as shocks that lead the actual price deviate from the 
equilibrium price 
  
     
  (      ) 
     
     
  
When the relationship (1)’ is assumed approximately log-linear, where lower-case letters 
indicates the natural log we get   
           
           
  
Considering year on year changes we achieve a short run inverse demand equation of price 
growth
 
which is our baseline equation of interest 
             
            
   (3) 
Short run since we consider period (yearly) changes. However, in the short run one could 
argue the dwelling stock be regarded as fixed. By allowing the dwelling stock to vary in (3) 
and given the proper inclusion of medium term
1
 determinants of housing demand in X, the 
relationship can hold for medium term price dynamics as well. 
On the supply side one can think of the flow of investments into housing as contributing to 
both the stock of housing increasing over time and maintaining the existing stock 
 (   )           (2)’ 
Assume that investments will depend on period t price expectations conditional on the 
available information set  . Then in a similar manner, a long run relationship for housing 
investment can be expressed as 
            (    | )       
        
 
For our analysis we are not interested in determinants of supply directly, but as shown by 
Sanchez and Johansson (2011) the responsiveness of housing supply to price changes is 
important in determining the evolution of house prices, and particularly the volatility of 
prices. There are reasons for suspecting interactions between demand and supply.  
                                                 
1
 I follow the conventional understanding of “medium term” as about 2-4 years, depending on the context.  
7 
 
I next turn to review some of the main components or concepts of demand and supply 
individually in the subsequent paragraphs and the variables used in relation to the theory in 
the econometric analysis  
 
2.2 Income and credit 
Macro-financial linkages 1 
A natural starting point in any demand function is income. Price growth in line with growth in 
households’ income can last for a substantial amount of quarters. Both from the perspective of 
access to borrowing linked to affordability and from the supply side it must be the case that 
disposable income, within reasonable bounds, constrains house price growth. The relationship 
between house prices and mortgage markets gained interest in the 1970’s when several 
advanced economies experienced their first house price booms (e.g. UK). Some argued the 
availability of credit was the most important driving factor, others that income growth was 
most important.  
Meen (2002 p. 13-14) show that credit constraints change the responsiveness of house prices 
to variables such as interest rates in the UK economy. Furthermore, if also down payment 
constraints (required deposit to buy a house) exist, then prices will be more sensitive to 
changes in income than in their absence. Meen use a simple model of this relationship on the 
UK economy:   
   
  
(    )
 
 
  
       
          (   )              
,where   is house price,  is income and    is the down payment ratio such that (    ) is 
the ‘Loan to Value’ ratio available on a mortgage. 
The units are chosen such that    (   )  A short disposition of the arguments is as follows: 
When     , the elasticity of house prices with respect to income equals 1, as is seen in 
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some empirical studies
2
 (long term elasticity). With      , as income rises, house prices 
rise more than proportionally. The down payment ratio itself rises with the level of prices 
(   )  At higher prices, the risk to lenders may rise and they may require a higher down 
payment.  Also, existing owners are wealthier and need to borrow less to finance a new house. 
Then variations in the down payment increase the volatility of prices compared with income 
changes, for given interest rates.  
Meen’s simple model may not have captured the ensuing development in mortgage markets 
for many OECD countries. In the US, down payment requirements fell towards zero at the 
turn of the millennium. In 1989 only 1 in 230 homebuyers made a down payment of 3 percent 
or less, by 2007 it was 1 in 3 (AEI 2012 p.1) along with substantial increases in house prices 
when mortgage backed security sales spiked. Within the simple model (2.1), such a feature 
would indicate that down payment ratios started decreasing when prices soared (   ) from 
developments outside the model. Although insufficient to describe the interactions between 
credit and demand, its essence bears some useful insights: Poorly regulated credit markets 
where a larger proportion of income can be spent on new house buys may amplify prices, 
which again may increase wealth and then demand (macro-financial linkages).  
In the same line of reasoning follow later work by Almeida et al. (2006). Their results indicate 
that cross-country differences in the maximum Loan to Value (LTV) ratio available on a 
mortgage can explain cross-country variation in the sensitivity of house prices and credit 
demand to income shocks. The initial shock changes household wealth through changes in 
housing prices, this in turn shifts household debt capacity, amplifying the impact of the initial 
shock on demand and prices, and so forth.  
Figure 2.1 plots the evolution of average real house prices (RHP) and disposable income 
(RDI) for 21 OECD countries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Terrones and Otrok (2004) estimate an income elasticity of 1.1 over 1970-2003 for 18 countries, OECD 
Economic Survey (2004) find an elasticity of 1.9 over the same period.  
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Figure 2.1 Development of log RHP and RDI. Unweighted country mean 
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This indicator increases if the country has implemented a capital adequacy ratio based on the 
Basle standard, if the banking supervisory agency is independent from executives’ influence, 
if a banking supervisory agency conducts effective supervisions and more so if these audits 
cover all financial institutions without exception. Andrews find that a high degree of banking 
supervision decreases overall volatility of prices (Andrews 2010 p. 25). We would expect this 
indicator to affect price dynamics through the income channel from an access-to-credit effect.  
 
2.3 The user cost of housing 
Macro-financial linkages 2 
A well-developed strand of literature on house price formation is grounded in asset pricing 
theory where the price of real estate regarded as an asset should arguably be in line with asset 
returns (see inter alia Poterba 1992). Asset returns when considering housing is again closely 
linked to the costs of holding the asset relative to other investments and expected capital gains 
(the user cost of housing). Price to rent ratios provide a second measure of disparity and asset 
price theory suggests that changes in the cost of owning versus renting a house in equilibrium 
could be used to predict price movements in the owner occupied sector. The user cost (UC) of 
housing provides this link. The conventional UC as defined in Poterba (1991 p. 1-9) is 
expressed as 
   [(    )(     )          ]          (   ) 
, where    is the marginal income tax rate,   the nominal mortgage interest,    the property 
tax rate, (     ) constitute the recurrent holding costs and consists of the risk premium 
on residential property ( ), maintenance ( ) and depreciation ( ) and   is the expected 
capital gain.  
For the sake of brevity I will not go into further details of the user cost theory here, but settle 
with stating that i) the user cost theory of housing and the related concept of permanent 
income is well founded in microeconomic theory and ii) many influential econometric models 
of house price dynamics incorporates elements from equation (2.2) (two seminal contributions 
are Poterba 1991 for a support of the theory and Englund, Ioannides 1992 for a critique).  
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From the user cost theory this analysis will use the CPI, the general price increase, as a proxy 
for the expected capital gain, the residential property tax and the real interest rate measuring 
the opportunity cost of foregone interest or the higher cost of mortgage loans in the 
econometric models of price dynamics.  
The preferential tax treatment of housing may affect price formation through both the supply 
and demand side. The analysis will consider shocks to structural unemployment being a 
measure of economic prospects or activity combined with differences in the degree of 
property tax (macro-financial linkages). Andrews (2010 p. 25-27) find that tax relief on 
housing increases the overall volatility of house prices and points to the possibility that 
generous tax policies may increase the expected net profits from speculative investments. It is 
natural to expect the residential tax to work in the opposite direction as the tax relief.  
The most relevant interest rate depends on the mortgage structure of a country. Depending on 
the composition of countries mortgages between fixed and variable rates I will use real long 
term and short term interest rates respectively. By increasing the costs of a loan it is expected 
that higher real rates, all else equal, put downward pressure on prices.  
 
2.4 The formation of price expectations  
The user cost theory is however silent as of the formation of the expected capital gains from 
buying a house. This feature may be important for price dynamics. A house is most often 
household’s most valuable asset. When faced with a price increase, given opportunity to buy 
the house, whether an agent is willing to make the investment could depend on several 
factors; the duration of the investment and the motivation of the buy, among them. If the 
house is bought mainly as a consumption good, but the household has a short term perspective 
before a resale then the expected resale value matters, in line with more speculative 
investments.  
However, there is some evidence that home buyers do not generally seem to be primarily 
driven by prospects of investment returns. A study by the Building Societies Association 
(BSA 2007 p.6-12) in the UK indicates that the primary motives for buying a home were the 
desire to own (88% of respondents) and that rental payments were wasted money (77%). 
12 
 
Financial gains were important for less than half of the respondents (45%). But a concern for 
would-be homeowners was the risk of being priced out of the market if prices rose (this was a 
motivation for 28% of first-time buyers and 63% of people considering buying for the first 
time). Hence, expectations of future price increases can increase demand even in the absence 
of speculators purely motivated by the prospects of capital gains. If expectations are formed 
on the basis of price history, such dynamics is important. There might of course be country 
heterogeneity in the formation and importance of price expectations.  
2.5 Supply 
Supply-demand linkages 
As briefly discussed in 2.1 there may be important supply-demand linkages influencing the 
responses of any shock to demand on prices. There are large country variations in the 
responsiveness of housing investment following a price increase. Supply-side restrictions 
such as zoning laws, the effectiveness of passing through building applications and 
transaction costs differ among OECD countries.  
Sanchez and Johansson (2011) estimate the long run elasticity of investment supply for 21 
OECD countries over 1980-2010 in a simultaneous equilibrium model of demand and supply 
with error correction. According to these estimates, the US and Sweden have the highest 
elasticity of investments (2.014 and 1.381 respectively) while the Netherlands and 
Switzerland have the lowest (0.186 and 0.146 respectively). The authors point to the dual 
effect of flexible supply; more flexible supply may lower the effect on prices when there is a 
shock to demand but also contribute to more cyclical house price swings in periods of growth 
through large increases in investment. Since the estimate period and countries are broadly the 
same, I will employ the results of this study in the subsequent analysis of price dynamics.  
Both the price responsiveness of income and the effects of demographic pressure may depend 
on the elasticity of supply. The dual effect theory then suggests that when demand for housing 
increases due to either an increase in income or more people competing for houses, higher 
house supply responses may, everything else equal, dampen the pressure on prices in an 
upswing since a larger proportion of the adjustments take place through quantity effects. But 
the mere fact that investments are cyclical may contribute to price swings.  
13 
 
Figure 2.3 plots the evolution of a proxy for the change in the dwelling stock and real prices 
at the OECD sample mean. Since dwellings completed necessarily lags the decision to invest, 
the broadly compatible larger turning points of these series suggests that price increases 
(decreases) lags increases (decreases) in investments, consistent with that investors on 
average have correct expectations of near future price dynamics which would propose a 
forward-looking approach.     
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Figure 2.2 Log dwellings completed and log RHP 
Data: OECD and national sources. Unweighted country mean 
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3 Data description 
Using a panel of 18 OECD countries this thesis will investigate whether differences in 
structural or policy factors such as the degree of banking supervision and taxation of 
property significantly affects the price responsiveness of shocks to demand in the short run 
(section 4) and in the cases of abrupt movements in prices and if there are evidence of 
asymmetries (section 5). The model is evaluated against episodes of large price falls and 
lastly a closer look at the run up years before the crash in the US housing market will be 
taken.  
Quarterly data on nominal and real second hand (mainly) house prices and private per 
working-age population disposable income for 21 OECD countries over the years 1975-2012 
are sourced from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy 
Institute and described in Mack and Martinez-Garzia (2011). Accordingly, the authors select 
closely comparable house price indices which are homogenized as much as possible to make 
the panel more suitable for comparisons across countries and time. Which market segment 
that is covered varies between countries
3
. 
Data on country yearly population density and real interest rates are collected from The World 
Data Bank (WB). Density is mid-year population divided by square kilometer land area 
excluding area under inland water, national claims to continental shelf and exclusive zones. 
This variable is chosen to capture demographic changes and relates demographics to available 
land (a 1 % increase in highly densed countries may put more pressure on housing availability 
than low densed ones). Real rates are calculated as     
(      )
(    )
, where    is period t nominal 
lending interest rate and    is period t inflation (GDP deflator).  
Annual long term interest rates and the CPI are collected from OECD Economic Outlook No 
93 and OECD Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics. It is 10 years interest rates on 
government bonds. Real long rates are calculated by subtracting the annual CPI. A composite 
real rate is constructed using the real long rate for countries where the mortgages are mainly 
issued with fixed rates and the IMF real rates where mortgages mostly issued with variable 
                                                 
3
 E.g. the Canadian prices cover apartments and two story dwellings located in ten main metropolitan areas 
whereas German prices cover annual, nationwide existing (second hand) single-family houses (most of the series 
are more similar than this example). In the econometric analysis, the inclusion of country specific effects will 
help deal with possible concerns raised by this cross-country heterogeneity in types of real estate.  
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rates. The information on the composition of mortgages is gathered from The European 
Mortgage Federation and OECD (Wyman 2003 p.29-30) and OECD Economic Outlook no. 
80 (2006 p. 145). Data on the NAIRU (non-accelerating unemployment rate) are sourced 
from OECD Economic Outlook no. 93 for all countries less S. Africa, which are 
supplemented by the (ordinary) unemployment rate sourced from IMF World Economic 
Outlook database. The nairu measures structural (equilibrium) unemployment and are less 
prone to short term temporary fluctuations not grounded in fundamental sources.  
Yearly data for new dwellings started are collected from OECD MEI for 10 countries and the 
rest of the countries less Luxembourg are supplemented from national sources using the 
search engine ‘Macrobond’ and aggregated into years where necessary4.  This particular 
variable turned out to be the most problematic one for which to find comparable country data.  
Data on private sector credit issued by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to 
GDP are collected from Beck et al. “Financial development and structure Dataset” (WB, 
revised 2013).   
In the absence of comparable numbers for the overall symmetry or lack of symmetry in 
taxation of financial objects for our purpose, we use data on the recurrent (annual) taxes on 
immovable property from OECD tax statistics as percent of GDP. Most countries have an 
annual property tax through the majority of the years 1975-2012.  
Yearly country data on financial reform and the degree of banking supervision between 1975 
and 2005 for the countries in our panel (less Luxembourg) are sourced from the financial 
reform database by Abiad et al. (2008). These are somewhat broad measures of the degree of 
financial deregulation in a country and the overall index is based on a total of 8 dimensions 
such as credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers in the 
banking sector and the degree of banking privatization.  
We use the estimates of long term country supply elasticities from Sanchez-Johansson and the 
indicator measuring the degree of banking supervision in a country from Abiad et al. as 
discussed in section 2.   
                                                 
4
 For Italy, Ireland and South Africa we have only data on number of permits issued for residential dwellings, 
which is lagged one year and used as a proxy. We lack several time-observations for some of the countries. 
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4 Short term price dynamics -
econometric analysis 
Throughout I will use the labels “short term price dynamics” or “short term model” for the 
results and models developed in this section to distinguish these from the models in the next 
chapter which are labelled “large price movement’s models” or the like in relation to 
“medium term price dynamics”. This is mainly categorical and do not presuppose that a 
complete analysis of either short term or medium term house price changes is executed. If so, 
there would have been a case for e.g. using shorter time periods such as quarters in this 
section.  
To estimate our equation of interest for short term dynamics (3) I use the change in the log 
real house price index as the dependent variable. There are several arguments for this choice, 
instead of using levels. Specifically, taking logs will linearize the growth in the original series 
and stabilize the variance of the differences. Graphically, the sample mean of the differenced 
log prices
5
 seem to revert to a mean about approximately 1-2 % growth with quite persistent 
deviations, and thus vulnerable to serial correlation
6
 (Figure 3.1). Including a constant is then 
equivalent to assuming a stochastic trend. Note however that this highly aggregated statistic 
does not give more than a broad picture of the average OECD development. 
Figure 3.1 First differenced log RHP. 
 
                                                 
5
 Taking second differences did not improve on the first differenced version, by informal comparison of graphs.  
6
 First differenced log real disposable income looks about the same evaluated at the sample mean; strongly 
trended in the logs, more stationary in first differences (Appendix 1) 
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As a starting point it is useful to check the order of integration of the series House prices and 
disposable income are found to have strong trend. Our series are quite long (T=38) compared 
with the number of groups (21 countries), although the panel is of such relative size that the 
panel aspect is likely to matter. The Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test indicate that 
log real house prices are I(1).  Cook and Vougas (2009) confirm the stationary characteristics 
of house price changes, but find that prices in addition exhibit structural breaks.  
Upon visual inspection, most country series of rates of price gains appear to show evidence of 
at least two structural breaks; the 90-91 recession looks more common to each country while 
the financial (housing) crisis 2007/2008 appear more idiosyncratic in nature. To incorporate 
these features and test for unit roots we use the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (CMR) unit root 
test with double mean shifters, additive outliers model
7
. As can be seen in Table A2 in the 
appendix , in line with previous research mentioned above, we cannot reject the null of a unit 
root in log prices for all 21 OECD countries in our sample including the weighted composite 
using a 5 % significance level. Moreover, the two structural breaks are almost everywhere 
significant, except for 3 cases
8
. 
Since we are interested in modelling in terms of changes of the variables, rather than levels, 
there is no need to test for co-integration among the price and the other variables provided the 
year % changes of income and the dwelling stock (figure 3) are approximately  ( ) as well, 
which for income is confirmed by the Levin-Lin-Chu test (appendix) and for dwellings 
suffices to examine Figure 2.2 on page 13. I will however, by the way of modelling, 
investigate the cointegration properties of the model through an error correction model.  
There is ample evidence of a consistent autoregressive pattern in data series for housing 
prices. Several studies find positive autocorrelation at short lags and negative autocorrelations 
at longer lags, consistent with the boom-bust cyclical patterns (see e.g. Englund and Ioannides 
1997 p.11). In this case, also the first differenced variable could be serially correlated in 
which case inference from estimation could be false. Here it is adjusted for serial correlation 
using different methods.   
  
                                                 
7
 The additive outliers (AO) model captures sudden changes in series. Canarella et al. (2010) show including 
structural breaks in unit root test is superior to other tests using US real estate price indices. 
8
 The 3 cases are the estimated breaks for Norwegian prices in 1987, Denmark in 2007 and S. Korea in 2004.  
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4.1 A baseline model 
The aim of this section is to investigate the statistical properties of models, compare these and 
evaluate estimates of driving factors behind short run (yearly) price changes to develop a 
model of the risk of large movements in prices in the medium term (3 years), which is the 
topic of the next section. There it will be argued that symmetrical models like these may not 
capture the “true” effects on price dynamics, at least in the steeper areas of the housing cycle. 
For the moment, however, we direct attention towards developing fruitful models for short 
term price dynamics and their implications.  
The theoretical framework is equilibrium in the housing market where short term price 
dynamics is explained by the demand side, but where households face different barriers such 
as more or less prudent banks across countries, as outlined in section 3. The baseline (4.1) 
models short term house price dynamics in a Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) random 
effects (RE) framework where changes in the log of real house prices are explained by 
changes in the log of real disposable income, changes in the dwelling stock, unemployment, 
the real or long term interest rate and structural factors identified through shocks to demand 
and a vector of controls for a country i at year t. The constant term is interpreted as a 
stochastic trend for the house price level.  
 
                                                                                
   
 
                  (   )  
                                                                                                                                           
, with AR(1)-errors                        | |     where     ~IID(0,   
 ) or white noise. Note 
that it is assumed that the parameter   is homogenous across countries.  
Alternatively      is IID across countries as the two-way (separate year intercepts) fixed 
effects alternative to (5). We will consider extensions to the baseline model.  
Since the panel is long(   ), asymptotics are in   with   fixed.  
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The dependent variable is the yearly percentage change in real house prices
9
 for year t and a 
country i,          is yearly percentage growth in real disposable income (RDI) potentially  
included with lags and also interacted with structural factors such as the degree of banking 
supervision in the country which varies a bit but not much over time (but varies between 
countries) and the price elasticity of supply,            is the lagged log change in the 
dwelling stock and       is a vector of time-varying controls including the start of period price 
inflation (CPI), % growth in the population density (pop. density) and the (lagged) change in 
the real rate or the long term interest rate, depending on the composition of mortgages 
between fixed and variable rates (Composite real rate). 
   are unobserved country random or fixed effects assumed constant over time and could be 
country heterogeneity in degree of home-ownership, real-estate structure and other time 
constant variables
10
 not captured by the model. Note that country specific-effects in this 
model refer to factors affecting the price changes. In the FE framework, the unobserved 
heterogeneity is allowed to be conditionally arbitrarily correlated with the explanatory 
variables, while the RE framework instead assume that    are realizations of an IID process 
with zero mean and constant variance, that is, the model puts the unobserved heterogeneity in 
the error term.  
I find that the FE model is rejected in favor of the RE approach by the Hausman test for some 
but not all specifications. Note also that (4.1) can be regarded as an a posteriori relationship. 
Several demand shocks have been tested in relations to structural factors but proved 
insignificant (more specifically, all the specifications in Table 5.2-3 in section 5 have been 
tested here as well). Results are reported in section 4.3.  
  
                                                 
9
  
          (
    
      
)    
            
      
   
10
 The examples mentioned are not necessarily time constant, but some features of them most probably are. E.g. 
cultural attitudes toward owning a home and the reported country price series.  
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4.2 Extensions to the baseline model 
One could instead model the dynamics by including a lagged dependent variable (LDV). The 
bias introduced will be ~  (
 
 
)  The contrasts to the AR(1) case will be related to dynamics, 
as well as interpretation (Beck 2005). The process of adjustment of changes in real prices may 
depend on the difference between the equilibrium level and previous years actual level or on 
habit formation, in which case a dynamic model is suited. Theoretical arguments for assuming 
the change of prices last year explains changes today could be the evidence we discussed 
briefly in section 2.4 from the study by the Building Societies Association (BSA, 2007) in the 
United Kingdom where many prospective homeowners report being concerned by the risk of 
being priced out of the market if prices rose as a rationale for entering the housing market. 
Then any period t demand depend on the previous vector of covariates, the price today and 
the price last period, which in the long run translates into the equilibrium price 
 (           )       ( )  
In addition we can pursue the equilibrium assumption of house prices further and estimate 
these models in an error correction framework (ECM). This approach is common in the 
housing literature (see inter alia Annett et al. 2005). If the level version of the demand 
equation holds in the long run, and prices are originally in equilibrium, any period change in 
one of the explanatory variables will induce two effects on prices; 1) the short term effect as 
measured by (4.1) and 2) a deviation from long term equilibrium. In essence it is just another 
way of modeling dynamics and the error correction theory provides nice interpretation 
             
               
   (   ) 
 
Below are estimation results for the baseline AR(1) model, the model with a lagged 
dependent variable (LDV) and the error correction version (ECM), all with country random or 
fixed effects for the shorter time period 1976-2006 for which data on the degree of banking 
supervision is available. The ECM is estimated by first running OLS on the (time) demeaned 
level variables using robust errors and then using the lagged residuals (EC) in the differenced 
version. (L) signify the variable is lagged and panel robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
The overall impression when comparing models is that dynamics seem to be important and 
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the FE LDV and ECM models have some advantages over the AR(1)-error model ( LR 
  ( )        )11  
It would not, in general, be expected that the structural factors significantly affect short term 
(yearly) house price dynamics, and the interactions have been included for comparison with 
the longer term dynamics. However, we get significant effects of the degree of banking 
supervision combined with income growth (columns 2.1-2 and 4.1-2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 This test statistic compares the AR 1 model to the LDV model. The ECM is just a reparameterization 
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4.3 Results short term price dynamics models 
Lags of income changes are not significant in the baseline (not included in results). All 
variables are in changes except the structural factors. (L) signify the variable is lagged and 
standard errors are in parentheses 
Table 4.1 Estimation results short term real house price growth AR(1)-model 
Dependent variable: RHP yearly % growth. AR(1) Baseline model (1.1-1.2) and shocks to real income (2.1-2.2)  
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) 
Variables RE_AR1 FE_AR1 RE_AR1 FE_AR1  
     
RDI  0.444*** 0.446*** 0.852*** 0.723** 
 (0.0934) (0.0963) (0.261) (0.281) 
NAIRU (L) -0.00540 -0.00418 -0.0549*** -0.0400** 
 (0.00391) (0.00397) (0.0131) (0.0158) 
Composite real rate (L) -0.00214** -0.00247*** -0.00296*** -0.00353*** 
 (0.000833) (0.000882) (0.000881) (0.000925) 
Dwelling stock  (L) -0.0170* -0.0133 -0.0287** -0.0124 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0112) (0.0120) 
Pop. density (L) 1.272 1.755 2.597*** 3.193** 
 (0.818) (1.109) (0.925) (1.325) 
CPI (L) -0.00564*** -0.00686*** -0.00374*** -0.00557*** 
 (0.00115) (0.00141) (0.00120) (0.00149) 
     
     
   -0.230*** -0.226** 
   (0.0857) (0.0895) 
   -0.146 0.0113 
   (0.238) 
 
(0.258) 
Constant 0.0992** 0.0875*** 0.151*** 0.0858*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0171) (0.0499) (0.0219) 
     
     
     
1 % RDI growth   0.533 0.410 
     
Observations 493 473 384 366 
Number of countries 20 20 18 18 
     
R squared (within)  0.11  0.17 
Estimated AR(1) 
coefficient
12
 
0.572*** 0.572*** 0.582*** 0.582*** 
Mod. Bhargava et al. 
Durbin-Watson 
0.975 0.975 0.979 0.979 
Hausman (p-value) 0.0675 0.0675 0.322 0.322 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
12
Serial correlation is tested for by the TSCS analogue of the standard LM-test. The t-stat of the OLS residuals of 
the model specification (1) on the lagged residual is 14.95. The residual is not significantly related to the other 
independent variables, except for the change in real disposable income, making the exogeneity-assumption in 
this model questionable, at least in the OLS-version. All specifications are tested and *** signify the coefficient 
on the lagged residual significant at 1 %. 
  
Demand shocks and structural factors 
 
Total impact (elasticity) of interacted variables on short term price growth at the mean of the structural 
variables   (mean degree of banking supervision= 1.385 over 1975-2006 
 
RDI × Banking Supervision 
RDI × Supply elasticity 
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Table 4.2 Estimation results short term real house price growth LDV and ECM models 
Dependent variable: RHP yearly % growth. LDV and ECM estimates. Baseline model (3.1-3.2) and shocks to 
real income (4.1-4.2) 
 (3.1) (3.2) (4.1) (4.2) 
Variables LDV FE ECM   LDV FE ECM 
     
RHP (L) 0.536***  0.495***  
 (0.0394)  (0.0448)  
RDI  0.410*** 0.964*** 0.836*** 1.088*** 
 (0.107) (0.115) (0.283) (0.328) 
NAIRU (L) -0.00500 -0.0156*** -0.0188** -0.0593*** 
 (0.00453) (0.00513) (0.00940) (0.0105) 
Composite real rate (L) -0.00266** -0.00207* -0.00343*** -0.00177 
 (0.00106) (0.00121) (0.00114) (0.00132) 
Dwelling stock (L) -0.0167** 0.0101 -0.0244** -0.0144 
 (0.00802) (0.00865) (0.0100) (0.0114) 
Pop. density (L) -0.0652 0.579 2.295** 2.912*** 
 (0.729) (0.752) (0.949) (0.915) 
CPI (L) -0.00177** -0.00369*** -0.00172* -0.00234** 
 (0.000806) (0.000909) (0.000940) (0.00110) 
Error Correction term (L) 
 
 -0.0736*** 
(0.0130) 
 
 -0.0635*** 
(0.0243) 
 
     
    
-0.292*** 
 
-0.353*** 
   (0.0892) (0.104) 
   0.0214 0.305 
             (0.268) (0.311) 
     
Constant 0.0845** -0.0282 0.113*** 0.0756 
 (0.0341) (0.0369)        (0.0416) (0.0478) 
     
     
     
1 % RDI growth   0.43 0.60 
     
Observations 493 507 384 384 
Number of countries 20 20 18 18 
R-squared (within) 
 
0.440 
   
0.268 0.503 0.326 
Still serial correlation? 
(LM test compared to 
AR1) 
Yes (much less)     Yes (less) 
 
Yes (much less)     Yes (less) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Everything else equal, the short term elasticity of prices with respect to real disposable 
income growth is estimated at 0.41 and 0.96 in the LDV and ECM baseline models (3.1-3.2). 
However, when we allow for different degrees of banking supervision, these results yields 
diverse effects of growth in disposable income.  
Demand shocks and structural factors 
 RDI× Banking Supervision 
RDI × Supply elasticity 
 
 
Total impact (elasticity) of interacted variables on short term price growth at the mean of the structural 
variables   (mean degree of banking supervision= 1.385 over 1975-2006) 
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CPI inflation and real interest rates have significant and negative effects on yearly RHP 
growth in all cases and these effects are quite robust to all specifications. Structural 
unemployment and population density growth is significantly negative when we include the 
interactions of wage growth with the structural factors and with the expected signs. Supply 
side factors such as the elasticity of supply identified through changes in income have poor 
short term explanatory power with respect to RHP growth, consistent with the theory on 
determinants of short term fluctuations in house prices. The change in the dwelling stock is 
significant and negative in the baseline models, but this effect disappears when allowing for 
interactions between income and bank prudence.  
The coefficient on the speed of adjustment of yearly RHP growth is about one half in the 
LDV cases, quite similar to our estimates of the AR(1)-coefficient. The coefficients on the 
error correction term in the ECM cases which measures yearly speed of adjustment toward 
equilibrium, are both small in absolute value and highly significant, which we would expect 
from the persistence detected in price movements. Any given deviation from equilibrium will 
then take a long time to correct in these specifications.   
How does these results compare to other studies? Annett et al (2005) estimate a panel 
regression on 8 Euro Area countries using fixed effects and ECM and find a short term 
elasticity of disposable income with respect to real house prices of 0.26 (0.7 in an ECM 
model), an elasticity of own price of 0.75 and effects of long term interest rates of -0.01 in a 
FE model. For our estimations, the significant and negative effects of the real interest rate, 
unemployment and the housing stock supply and the significantly positive effects of income 
and historic price movements are in line with estimates of longer term effects on price levels 
found in several studies (see Girouard et al. 2006 p. 11-15 for a survey although most are 
individual country studies).  
To the extent prudential banks capture a credit-effect, though not directly comparable, 
Almeida et al (2006 p.14 and 17) find positive and significant effects of the maximum Loan-
to-Value ratio
13
 in a country interacted with income growth on yearly house price changes for 
26 OECD countries over 1970-1999. So we may be able to conclude our results in this section 
conforms with existing findings of the driving factors behind short term price movements in a 
panel context.  
                                                 
13
 We expect the degree of banking supervision and the maximum LTV ratio to capture opposite effects.  
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5 The risk of large movements in real 
house prices 
 
A housing cycle is what happens between the short term movements and long run growth of 
housing prices  
 
In section 4 a model for the change in house prices from year to year was estimated. Prices 
were explained by fundamental variables suggested by economic theory. The above quote is 
not really a quote in the ordinary sense that some influential economist has said it. But there is 
a tendency in empirical and theoretical work on house price formation to focus on short and 
long term determinants and then volatility or standard deviations of prices for what happens in 
between. These approaches in turn have in common that they silently assume a unified 
framework for ups and downs. The recent crisis in USA, Ireland and Spain has spurred 
interest in what causes abrupt falls in house prices. Some speak of bubbles that burst. One 
idea that has gained attention is that bubbles create asymmetries in the distribution of price 
changes, abrupt falls being more likely than abrupt increases. 
Let us investigate some of the time series properties of a simple linear AR(2) model for the 
composite (weighted and including 21 countries) OECD real log house price series ( ) 
                              (   ) 
, where       (    
 ). 
A simple OLS estimation of (   ) yield the results (5.2) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
    
     
(     )
 
 
              
(     )
 
 
           
(     )
          (   )
14
 
 
                                                 
14
 The homogenous solution to (5.2) is     (     )
 (    (      )      (      )), for some constants      
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Both roots of the corresponding solution for    are complex and the long term solution is 
stable with damped oscillating swings, consistent with the visual impression of a cyclical, 
mean reverting pattern. Figure 4.1 plots the yearly changes for a fitted model using the 
parameters in (5.2) and the actual series for the OECD composite real house price yearly 
growth.  
Figure 4.1 Fitted AR(2) model RHP growth 
 
 
The first thing that should be noted is that the AR(2) model captures the overall movement of 
the data. However, this fitted linear model has much larger spikes (which would translate into 
swings in the levels version), a feature that is most evident for negative growth than above the 
zero-line, especially over the large falls. If rises and falls in prices occur at different speed, the 
possibility that different economic forces are at work is at least present in the data.  
The model from section 3 can in principle be used to estimate the probability of large changes 
in house prices contingent on the explanatory variables. However, if there are asymmetries or 
nonlinearities the estimates could be misleading. There is a case for estimating probabilities 
for large falls and increases in prices more directly, a task we now turn to.  
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Section 5.1 defines what is going to be meant by large price changes. Section 5.2 defines an 
econometric model for estimating boom- and bust risks separately. In 5.3 are estimation 
results from a linear probability model. This allows for an analysis of asymmetry; whether 
changes in any covariates are driving factors behind booms and busts and if there are signs of 
any differential driving factors underlying a protracted period of price appreciation and a 
period of depreciation. Section 5.4 focus on abrupt price falls and estimates a logistic model 
as an alternative. In 5.5 a forecasting model is estimated and 5.6 fit this model for the US.  
5.1 A cut-off value for booms and busts 
 
To qualify as a boom, define a cut-off value of price appreciation of more or equal to 22 % 
over 3 years (the volatile periods “in between” short and long term growth), which amounts to 
an average of about 7.33 % yearly growth (H) in real prices. A bust is defined as a 10 % real 
price depreciation over 3 years as well
15
 (L) or 3.33 % yearly decrease. These particular 
values are chosen since we capture around 15 % of the empirical 3 year price movements in 
each case, and decide to call these episodes for booms and busts henceforward.  
This procedure is chosen for simplicity, more advanced methods such as the Bry and Boschan 
(1971) cycle-dating procedure used in the literature could be a refinement on this point 
(described in Harding 2003). The three year criterion may, however, seem more restrictive 
than it actually is, any boom/bust lasting longer than 3 years will qualify but shorter period 
cycles will not
16
.  Table 5.1 below lists the episodes of real price depreciations satisfying 
criteria (L) 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 A binary variable for each cut off value is defined where     
     if the boom criteria are satisfied and zero 
otherwise, with a mean value .155. Similarly     
     if the bust criteria are met and zero otherwise, with mean 
value .155, where the 3 years prior to 1978 is excluded since we cannot calculate 3 year changes.  
16
 If a country experience a 5 year boom, then this model will evaluate the first three years of the boom, the forth 
to the second year of the boom etc. 
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Table 5.1 Episodes of real house price busts by country 1975-2012 
The episodes and years in the table satisfy the bust criteria of less than or equal to 10 % real price depreciation 
the last 3 years. 
Country timespan total contraction 
% 
episodes years  
     
1 Australia       -    - 0 0 
2 Belgia ’79-‘85 -41.7  1 6 
3 Canada ’82-‘85 -33.6 1 3 
4 Switzerland ’89-‘98 -45.0  1 9 
5 Germany ’82-‘85 -12.0  1 3 
6 Denmark ’79-’83,  
’86-’92,  
’07-‘12 
-26.1 
-34.2   
-29.0 
 
 
3 
 
 
15 
7 Spain ’79-’84  
’91-’94 
’07-‘12 
-23.5  
-17.2    
-36.9 
 
 
3 
 
 
13 
8 Finland ’75-’79  
’89-‘95 
-19.7  
-56.9 
 
2 
 
10 
9 France ’80-‘85 -18.6 1 5 
10 UK ’89-’94  
’07-‘11 
-27.6 
-16.0 
 
2 
 
9 
11 Ireland ’79-’82  
’81-’84  
’06-‘12 
-11.0  
-11.1   
-42.0      
 
 
3 
 
 
11 
12 Japan ’91-’94  
’00-‘06 
-14.0  
-24.0 
 
2 
 
9 
13 S. Korea ’83-’87  
’90-‘00 
-13.4  
-73.8 
 
2 
 
14 
14 Netherlands ’78-’84  
’08-‘12 
-58.5 
-19.4 
 
2 
 
10 
15 Norway ’87-‘93 -40.6 1 6 
16 New Zealand ’75-’80  
’07-‘10 
-43.9  
-12.0 
 
2 
 
8 
17 Sweden ’79-’85  
’90-‘95 
-44.8  
-32.5 
 
2 
 
11 
18 US ’06-‘12 -28.7 1 6 
19 South Africa ’75-’79  
’82-’88  
’89-‘94 
-21.0 
-45.9, 
-19.5 
 
 
3 
 
 
15 
20 Italy ’75-’79 
’81-’85 
’92-’98 
’08-‘12 
-26.7 
-20.3 
-30.0 
-18.1 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
18 
21 Luxembourg ’79-‘84 -24.9 1 6 
 
Total 
   
38 
 
187 
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There were 38 episodes in total where real prices fell more than 10 % over 3 years covering 
187 year observations across countries. Denmark, South Korea and Italy have had most 3-
year spans with large falls in prices, while Australia is the only country with none such 
episodes. A similar account of 3 year increases in real prices of more than 22 % (H) lists 47 
such episodes. Below we have drawn the Kernel distribution estimate for 3 year change in 
real house prices along with a fitted normal density 
 
Figure 5.1 The empirical distribution of 3 year price dynamics 
 
The Kernel density for 3-year changes in prices appears normally distributed with more mass 
for positive values than negative. Average 3-year real price appreciation is 5.2 %. As can be 
seen in the figure, the booms are more frequent and translate into higher growth rates in our 
panel than the busts in the extreme cases (there have been episodes with up to 60 % 3-year 
price appreciations, but only a bit less than 52 % 3-year price depreciations). The cut-off 
values are marked in the Kernel. In comparison to the AR(2) fitted model for yearly price 
changes, the overestimation of price falls suggested by figure 4.1 is consistent with the  
differences in tails in the medium run actual data. Otherwise the distribution is quite 
symmetrical around the mean.  
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For our theoretical model, augment equation (5.3) below to apply for three year or lagged 
three year changes (5.4), which can be interpreted as medium term price appreciations
17
. Then 
the change in the growth rate of new dwellings in           is implemented instead of the log 
new dwellings relative to base in the short term model 
                 
                   
     (5.3) 
                         
                        
     (5.4) 
 
5.2 Large price movements –econometric 
analysis 
Redefine the dependent variable as a binary variable equal to 1 if criterion H is met and 
another equal to 1 if criterion L is met. Then a Linear Probability Model (LPM) version of 
(5.4) is
18
 
    (    
   )                                                                     
                                                                               
 
         
              (   )  
                     ,      
,where     
    if (            )     
 
Equation (5.5) states that the probability of a boom (bust) for a country i in year t is a linear 
function of demand side factors whose effect depends on country specific structural factors, 
the change in the growth rate of the dwelling stock and a vector of controls.  The 
abbreviations have the same interpretations as in section 4. Since we look at past 3 year 
changes, the covariates are mainly included as past 3 year changes in line with equation (5.4) 
or changes between 4 years ago and last year to look at the run up year before the boom/bust 
start-up. The house price growth in the run up year is also included in the vector of controls Z.  
                                                 
17
 The optimal way of including these explanatory variables is not obvious and several methods have been tested. 
18
 There are several limitations to the linear probability model discussed in Appendix; however, the model is a 
natural extension to our baseline model and allows for easy parameter interpretation.  
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The country specific effect    can be thought of as the combined effect of omitted country-
specific covariates that cause some countries to be more prone to large rises or falls in prices 
as others, such as home ownership rates or housing investment patterns.  
A multiple of specifications have been tested. The three types of demand shocks; to the 
NAIRU, real disposable income, and demographics interacted with structural factors 
(            ) are included sequentially in the LPM FE/RE framework with “lagged 
dependent variable
19”. Of course, when the dependent variable is transformed this way, this 
interpretation is no longer strictly correct.  
 
5.3 Results Boom and Bust risks 
Growth to real disposable income is still important in the medium run and indicative of boom 
and bust probabilities. Other macroeconomic terms have higher power towards boom 
probabilities than busts. Also, this evidence suggest that supply-side and structural factors 
matters more in the cases of large price movements than in the general short term models 
from section 3.  
The estimates below indicate some interesting results in direction of symmetry and 
asymmetry;  
a) The baseline models (1.1-2)  
In the baseline version corresponding to section 4, whether real house prices rose in the pre 
potential boom/bust year affects the probability of a boom/bust with the expected signs; such 
a feature increases the probability of a boom and decreases the probability of a bust. For our 
other macroeconomic terms, growth to real disposable income in the run-up year and during 
the potential boom significantly increases the boom- and reduces the bust probability, 
whereas increased CPI inflation reduces the boom-chances. However, CPI growth is 
insignificant with respect to the probability of a bust.  
An increase in the growth rate of new dwellings in the run-up year and during a potential bust, 
significantly (at 1 % level) increases the bust-chances when countries have equal or below 
                                                 
19
 The model with LDV had least serial correlation in the yearly price dynamics models.  
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OECD average change in the growth rate of new dwellings
20
 and reduces the bust-chances 
otherwise. This latter feature is consistent with the idea that countries that experience 
especially rigid supply in the medium term (3 years here) as compared to the OECD average, 
and the rigidity increases, will have a higher bust-probability and vica versa. Also, according 
to these results, this effect is asymmetric; the probability of a boom is not affected in either 
specification below. Andrews (2010 p. 25) find positive but (highly) insignificant effects on 
overall house price volatility from dwelling investment growth.  
b) Structural factors models (2.1-2) Macro-financial linkages 
According to these results, negative shocks to demand represented by an increase in the 
NAIRU have differential effects depending on the level of property tax
21
 in the country; An 
increase in structural unemployment will decrease both the probability of a boom and a bust 
depending on the level of residential property tax in the country, which suggests a reduction 
in overall volatility. These results are in line with the findings of Andrews (2010 p. 25) that 
tax relief on housing (the opposite) increases overall volatility.  
c) Structural factors model (3.1-2) Supply-demand linkages and credit effects 
If instead we believe structural factors affect booms and busts mainly through income shocks, 
then the boom-probability following an increase in the growth rate of real income decrease 
quite sharply if the elasticity of supply is high while such effects are not evident for busts. 
Instead, and somewhat surprisingly, the bust probability following an increase in the growth 
rate of income increases in the degree of banking supervision.  
Daring to propose an explanation to this latter, somewhat counterintuitive result, it could 
result from a) The indicator capturing supervision of banks is positively correlated (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.5) with credit growth defined as credit issued by deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions to GDP (WB data). It makes sense that countries 
increase supervision when inhabitant’s debt to income ratios inflates. Or both have increased 
over time due to expansive financial markets and common OECD standards. We could thus 
capture credits effects, as intended, but with the reversed sign. b) Higher supervision countries 
may on average have higher standards towards borrowers. Since wages are rigid downwards 
                                                 
20
 New dwellings are normalized to a base year, so only relative changes matter within each country (See 4 
Data). Average 3 year change in the growth rate of new dwellings is -0.053.  
21
 It is particularly important to pay attention to possible endogeneity problems related to this property tax 
measure, which is always included with at least one lag.  
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we would hardly ever see a fall in income even though prospects are bad. Then cautious 
banks may hold back on mortgages to the most risky applicants thereby increasing the risk of 
a bust as credit constrained households are held out of the market.  
Andrews (ibid) find that increased banking supervision decreases overall volatility, when 
evaluated alone, and not combined with a shock to income. These results then conflicts with 
Andrews’ although direct comparison is difficult due to the differences in specifications.   
d) Structural factors model (4.1-2) Supply-demand linkages 
The impact from demographic shocks measured by an increase in the population density 
growth rate is somewhat ambiguous, depending on the model being estimated. There is 
however evidence of decreased overall volatility when increases in population density is 
combined with high elasticity of housing supply, as this decreases the risk of both a boom and 
a bust in (4).  Andrews find ambiguous results of the supply elasticity on overall volatility, 
depending on the model and insignificant effects of increases in population density (ibid).  
Some general remarks; I am restricting attention toward signs of effects as well as statistical 
significance due to a couple of nonsensical results regarding magnitudes in this linear model. 
The most outlandish must be the response in column 3.1 of a 1 % income shock, which 
supposedly increases the probability of a bust by 3.2. But both signs and significance is robust 
(there are however some differences in significance levels) to alternative models with more 
theoretically plausible outcomes bounded on (0, 1). The magnitudes of effects will be 
discussed in a logistic model in the next section considering risks of price falls only. 
Remember also the models with structural factors are estimated on a shorter time period 
(1975-2006) than the baseline models (1975-2012) due to data shortage, and for the same 
reason cover only 18 countries as opposed to 20. There are thus some problems of 
comparability.  
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Results LPM FE models with lagged dependent variable.  All variables are in 3 year changes 
except the structural factors which are in levels and the run up year price growth (RHP L.3). 
(L) signifies the variable is lagged and panel robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Table 5.2 Estimation results 1 Boom and Bust risks LPM 
Dependent variable: Pr(Boom/Bust). Baseline model (1.1-1.2) and shocks to the nairu (2.1-2.2) 
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) 
VARIABLES LPM Boom LPM Bust  LPM Boom LPM Bust 
     
RHP (L.3) 0.888*** -0.386 1.273*** -0.0543 
 (0.304) (0.272) (0.328) (0.277) 
RDI 1.534*** -0.617* 2.187*** -0.935** 
 (0.416) (0.371) (0.466) (0.405) 
CPI (L) -0.0163** -0.00113 -0.0223*** 0.000578 
 (0.00739) (0.00660) (0.00796) (0.00663) 
Composite real rate (L) -0.0111* 0.00417 -0.00917 -0.000591 
 (0.00653) (0.00583) (0.00688) (0.00572) 
NAIRU  (L) -0.0321* 0.0514*** -0.0512 0.0828** 
 (0.0187) (0.0167) (0.0457) (0.0400) 
Pop. density (L) 0.593 2.887* 0.0638 -1.187 
 (1.925) (1.720) (1.301) (1.339) 
Dwelling stock (L) 0.0273 -0.233*** -0.0692 -0.217*** 
 (0.0561) (0.0501) (0.0652) (0.0548) 
     
     
NAIRU × Supply Elasticity   0.0758 0.0961* 
   (0.0585) (0.0507) 
NAIRU × Property Tax (L)   -0.0401** -0.0475*** 
   (0.0171) 
 
(0.0143) 
Constant 0.0513 0.0994** 0.0231 0.175*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0430) (0.0392) (0.0391) 
     
     
     
1 % increase in NAIRU   -0.044 0.098 
     
     
Observations 446 446 404 404 
Number of countries 20 20 18 18 
R squared 0.143 0.215   
Fixed or random effects FE FE RE RE 
Hausman test P-value 
( RE efficient under Ho) 
0.000 - 0.0002 - 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Demand shocks and structural factors 
Total impact of interacted variables on boom/bust probabilities at the mean of the structural variables   (mean 
property tax revenues equal to 1.11 % of GDP over 1975-2012, mean supply-elasticity= .703) 
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Table 5.3 Estimation results 2 Boom and Bust risks LPM 
Dependent variable: Pr(Boom/Bust). Shocks to real disposable income (3.1-2) and population density (4.1-2) 
 (3.1) (3.2) (4.1) (4.2) 
Variables LPM Boom LPM Bust LPM Boom LPM Bust 
     
RHP (L.3) 0.963*** -0.283 1.104*** -0.242 
 (0.370) (0.306) (0.330) (0.286) 
RDI 4.627*** -2.642*** 2.276*** -0.934** 
 (1.127) (0.924) (0.466) (0.448) 
CPI (L) -0.0118 0.00198 -0.0192** 0.00492 
 (0.00849) (0.00703) (0.00797) (0.00671) 
Composite real rate (L) -0.00584 0.00152 -0.00931 -0.000924 
 (0.00775) (0.00642) (0.00691) (0.00583) 
NAIRU  (L) -0.0442* 0.102*** -0.0433* 0.102*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0217) (0.0230) (0.0213) 
Pop. density (L) 3.943** -3.215** 3.013* 5.454 
 (1.905) (1.534) (1.744) (4.016) 
Dwelling stock (L) -0.0724 -0.0433 -0.0775 -0.206*** 
 (0.0835) (0.0690) (0.0651) (0.0562) 
     
     
RDI × Supply elasticity -2.028** 0.00407   
 (0.815) (0.660)   
RDI × Banking supervision -0.432 0.898***   
 (0.370) (0.304)   
Pop.density × Supply elasticity   -3.339** -9.900* 
   (1.449) (5.643) 
Constant -0.0302 0.205*** 0.0196 0.203*** 
 (0.0531) (0.0431) (0.0384) (0.0488) 
     
     
     
1 % RDI growth 3.20 -1.40   
1 % population growth   0.67 -1.50 
     
     
Observations 318 318 404 404 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 
R squared    0.271 
Wald Chi_2 71.19 78.82 93.57  
Fixed or random effects RE RE RE FE 
Hausman test P-value 
( RE efficient under Ho) 
- - 0.000 0.1240 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demand shocks and structural factors 
 
Total impact of interacted variables  on boom/bust probabilities at the mean of the structural variables   (mean 
degree of banking supervision= 1.385 over 1975-2006, mean supply-elasticity= .703) 
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5.4 Isolating abrupt price falls 
There are some evidence of different influential driving factors involved for our simple 
predictor of booms and busts. The existence of asymmetries in the housing cycles could make 
demand relations such as that estimated in section (4) dependent on a sort of switching 
regime, in which case any prediction problem become a nonlinear one. This would evidently 
affect empirical results. If a downturn is fundamentally different from expansions
22
, a 
symmetric model would fail to capture both. Asymmetries can arise as i) different magnitude 
of effects, ii) different driving factors or iii) non-reversed signs of effects, among others.  
Based on the estimations reported in section 5.3 one might do better by estimating different 
models for the boom- and bust risks. If we gather the information about relative significance 
from the symmetric models, two such general relationships that incorporates this is  
 (    
   )   (       (         )                (     )         (         )    ) (  ) 
  (    
   )   (  (        )        (     )         (         )          ) (  ) 
 
 , where t ~ 3 year period,     year(s)  prior to 3 year period, (   )  run-up year and 2 
years into 3 year period and  ( )  ( )  some functions of the included variables/ functions 
of variables bounded on (   ).  
The relationships (  ) and (  ) summarizes the discussion in 5.3. For any country i in a year 
t shocks to wages give differential effects on the boom-probability (H) through different 
supply responsiveness in (10), while for the Bust-probability (L) this effect works through 
bank prudence. Historic house price movement had much more predictive power towards the 
risks of a boom than a bust. The nairu combined with property tax enters in both, as does 
population density growth combined with the elasticity of supply. The general price inflation 
appears only in (10), while the growth rate of the dwelling stock appears only in (11).  
I will focus on the probability of a bust for the remaining, that is, on equation (11). Also, 
assume there is a relationship between (10) and (11) in the sense that if (10) has been realized 
(there has been a boom in   ), this affects the probability of a bust. Table X below reports 
                                                 
22
 The existence of asymmetries over the business cycle has been widely debated but, to my knowledge, there is 
no discussion of asymmetries over the housing cycle despite the close connection between the two.  
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estimation results for a RE Logit model
23
 (5) where the odds ratios (OR) are given in the table 
together with a RE LPM (6) for comparison with earlier estimates, for an estimating model 
based on equation (11)  
 
Table 5.4 Estimation results Bust risks Logit 
Dependent variable: Pr(Bust). RE Logit (5) and RE LPM (6) estimates 
 (5) (6) 
Variables RE_Logit RE_LPM 
 OR Coeff. 
   
Dummy (=1 if boom before potential bust) 5.106*** .144*** 
 (2.652) (0.0385) 
RHP (L.3) 0.0924 -0.3027 
 (0.337) (0.276) 
RDI  0.968*** -2.728*** 
 (0.0118) (0.6757) 
NAIRU (L) 6.851*** 0.1445*** 
 (4.734) (0.2389) 
Pop. density  (L) (×1000) 0.894* -0.0043** 
 (0.0519) (0.0018) 
Dwelling stock   0.599 -0.0835 
 (0.484) (0.064) 
Real disposable income growth × Banking Supervision 1.011* 0.9076*** 
 (0.00594) (0.2762) 
NAIRU × Property tax 0.548** -0.052*** 
 (0.151) (0.01485) 
Pop. density × Supply Elasticity 1.031 0.0005 
 (0.0411) (0.00135) 
Constant 0.130*** 0.188*** 
 (0.102) (0.0385) 
   
Total effect of income shock at banking supervision mean (=1.385)  -1.47 
Total effect of shock to structural unemployment at property tax mean 
(=1.1 % of GDP) 
 0.102 
Total effect of 10 % population density growth  -0.43 
   
Observations 335 335 
Number of countries 18 18 
   
LR-test for rho=0: chi_2(1) 1.43  
Wald Chi_2 27.83 132 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
According to the estimates, a 3 year real price appreciation of more than or equal to 20 %, 
increases the probability of a subsequent bust by 14.4 % or the odds of a bust by about 5 
compared to a country with no such boom. The estimates are significant at the 1 % level. 
Otherwise these models summarize the findings from our previous section. The results are 
                                                 
23
 Both the Logit and an equivalent Probit model estimation reports a log likelihood of -141.   
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quite robust to different specifications, as the comparison of the LPM and Logit estimates 
broadly confirms in columns (5) and (6).  
The model (11) explains the risk of large falls in real house index prices over a period of 3 
years in 18 OECD countries as a function of changes in structural and demand side factors 
and historic price behavior. The particular specification of dynamics, however, limits 
inference of driving factors to a rather contemporaneous one. The probability of a bust is 
explained by random country specific effects and changes in the confounders during and only 
including the run up year of any potential bust. This perspective is valuable, but more so if the 
model has forecasting abilities.  
5.5 Forecasting 
From the observed rigidities and cyclicality of house prices and when prices are thought to be 
misaligned with fundamentals (such as income or unemployment) one often talks of build-ups 
in the housing market. The development in the overall economy and the history of prices over 
a period of time, such as 3 years or more may then contribute to such build-ups. In this 
process we will expect the risk of large falls in prices to gradually increase. Here we consider 
the (in sample) forecasting abilities of model (11) to predict the probability of falling prices 
next year based on a 4 year history of development in the confounders and evaluate the model 
against data. Will the model be able to predict e.g. the protracted fall in prices starting in the 
US in 2006?  
The dichotomous dependent variable is set to one if real prices fall more than or equal to 3.3 
percent the coming year
24
, the equivalent of the 3 year criterion in the previous sections. I use 
the logistic model due to its theoretical advantages, and define a model (12) 
 (  (      
   )|    )   
   
(     )
 
                                                                  
                                                                                   
                                              (  )  
, F= Falling prices next period 
                                                 
24
 This criterion is met in 19 % of the country year observations 
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The interpretation of the variables is the same as before and E is the mathematical 
expectations operator. The right hand side of this first expression is the CDF of a logistic 
distribution and all coefficients should be interpreted as conditional on the country specific 
effect.   
Below are estimation results reported by the odds ratios together with the average marginal 
effects (AME) evaluated at       The coefficients on historical price movements are both 
large in magnitude and highly significant, resulting in large increases in the odds of price falls 
following a 3 year increase in prices. A test of the joint insignificance of all other 7 
coefficients (from income growth onwards in table 5.5) rejects at 0.05 % (  ( )       ). 
We are thus not only capturing own price effects in (12) 
 
Table 5.5 Estimation results Forecasting price falls 
Dependent variable: Pr(falling prices). RE Logit odds ratios and AMEs 
 (7)   
Variables RE Logit AME  
 
 
OR   
Dummy (=1 if boom before potential bust) 3.022*** 0.1394***  
 (1.041) (.0410)  
D3. RHP growth % 72.26*** 0.5396***  
 (98.56) (1589)  
D3. Real disposable income growth % 1.000 -0.000  
 (0.00665) (.0008)  
D3. Change in NAIRU % (L) 2.372*** 0.109***  
 (0.669) (.0311)  
D3. Population density growth % (L) (×1000) 0.937** -0.008**  
 (0.0263) (0.0034)  
D3. Change in dwelling stock growth rate 0.827 -.0239  
 (0.494) (0.075)  
Real disposable income growth × Banking Supervision 0.995* -0.00065*  
 (0.00326) (0.0004  
NAIRU × Property tax 0.7991* -0.0283*  
 (0.115) (0.017)  
Population density growth × Supply Elasticity 1.033* 0.0041*  
 (0.0203) (0.002)  
Constant 0.282***   
 (0.129)   
    
Observations 335   
Number of countries 18   
LR-test for rho=0: chi_2(1) 1.56   
LR Chi_2 53.06   
Rho (intra-class correlation) 0.083   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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How well does this model predict historical episodes? The significant parameters from the RE 
Logit estimation are used to calculate probabilities of falling prices at the eve of a bust 
satisfying criteria L and compared to country specific averages evaluated at      in table 
5.6. Compare the tipping points with the episodes listed in table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.6 Bust probabilities at the eve of protracted price falls 1975-2006 
The episodes satisfy the bust criteria of more than or equal to 10 % real price depreciation the next 3 years. 
Country Tipping point(s) 
‘year 
Pr(Bust) (mean) SD 
from 
mean 
SD 
     
1 Australia none    
2 Belgia ‘79 .809  (.256) 2.99 .185 
3 Canada ‘81 .486  (.136) 3.22 .109 
4 Switzerland ‘89 .159  (.150) 0.07 .137 
5 Germany -    
6 Denmark 
 
’79 and  
‘86 
.672  (.268) 
.580  (.268) 
2.10 
1.63 
.192 
7 Spain ‘8225 and 
‘91 
.801  (.339) 
.658  (.339) 
1.70 
1.17 
.273 
8 Finland ‘88 .788  (.386) 1.63 .247 
9 France ‘79 .580  (.175) 2.55 .159 
10 UK ’89 and 
‘05 
.250  (.219) 
.560  (.219) 
.18 
1.99 
.171 
11 Ireland ‘0526 .044  (.025)      1.19 .016 
12 Japan ‘91 .330  (.209) 1.51 .080 
13 S. Korea -    
14 Netherlands ’79 and 
‘05 
.839  (.193) 
.500  (.193) 
3.08 
1.48 
.208 
15 Norway ‘87 .520  (.170) 2.33 .150 
16 New Zealand -    
17 Sweden ’79 and 
‘90 
 
.542  (.299) 
.546  (.299) 
1.60 
1.625 
.152 
18 US ’79 and 
‘05 
.554  (.191) 
.256  (.191) 
2.52 
1.17 
.144 
19 South Africa -    
20 Italy ’81 and 
‘92 
.484  (.330) 
.495  (.330) 
.92 
.99 
.167 
21 Luxembourg -    
 
The model (12) was estimated over the histories of the countries in question so we would 
expect to get higher probabilities on average before an adverse price movement. But it is one 
                                                 
25
 First available data for Spain,, while the tipping point is around 1979. This means we here evaluate the 
probability in the midst of a bust. 
26
 Due to data shortage the episode starting in ’79 is not included in the table. This shortage also makes the mean 
and SD probability of high-volatility Ireland questionable since the calculations are based on a short, perhaps 
unrepresentative sample.  
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thing to say the probabilities are higher on average and quite another to expect it to hold at a 
single point in time for a country. In addition, the dependent variable in (12) is not taking into 
account the cut-off measure (<=-10 % over 3 years) in real prices but nonetheless serves as a 
proxy in that the aggregated series show clear state dependence between subsequent years 
(ref. section 2).  
The overall picture is that the model predicts many of the significant downturns experienced 
by a number of countries over the last decades. For Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands 
(’79 case) and the US (’79 case) the calculated probabilities are between 2.5-3.2 standard 
deviations away from their respective means. The model does not fare well in predicting the 
downturns in Switzerland (’89) and the UK (’89) however, where such probabilities would be 
regarded as ‘business as usual’ on any interesting scale.  
 
5.6 The case of US 
 
The crash in the US housing market in 2006 had widespread consequences for the world 
economy and has since directed increased attention among economists and policy makers 
towards the importance of the functioning of the housing market in connection to the real 
economy. Figure 5.2 display the evolution of our fitted forecasting model for the US along 
with the actual house price growth 
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Figure 5.2 The evolution of the forecasted risk of a Bust for the US 
 
 
 
As can be seen in the figure, the bust risk increased quite sharply between 2000 and 2005, 
interrupted only by a slight fall in 2004. In 2005 it reaches a high of .256, which is 1.17 
standard deviations away from the mean (table 5.6) based on the longer time period 1975-
2006. This upward movement of risk is driven by a long period of increasing house prices, 
increases in structural unemployment (figure 5.3), a decline in the population density growth 
rate and falls in the growth rate of disposable income for some, but not all years (that is, the 3 
year development up until the particular year).  
 
Figure 5.3 The US NAIRU over 1985-2008 
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Predicted probabilities based on the results in table 5.5. A constant is added to 
the actual real house price growth series for visual comparison.  
Figure 5.3 show that structural 
unemployment increased quite 
markedly in the US between 2000 and 
2008, and contributed to a noticeable 
increase in the risk in the housing 
market in my model. 
Data: OECD  
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6 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate empirically how differences in structural and 
policy factors affects the house price responsiveness of shocks to demand in the short run and 
in the cases of abrupt movements in house prices.  
To this end several, relatively parsimonious, models founded in economic theory are 
presented, each aiming at addressing different aspects of some of the questions involved. 
Each model builds on the former, from start to end.  
The advanced country perspective is chosen since the national or aggregate level is the most 
natural unit for comparison of differences in regimes, and at the same time similar enough to 
allow any comparison at all. It should be noted, however, that aggregate information at the 
country level might hide important regional differences within countries.  
A parallel purpose has been to explore a non-unified treatment of booming and busting house 
price periods and provide empirical evidence of asymmetries and similarities, which is an 
undeveloped area of economic research.  
In a short term (yearly) model I find evidence of diverse effects of shocks to households’ 
income depending on the standards towards monitoring of banks and financial institutions.  
Evaluating periods of sharp price falls and increases separately, these results indicate that the 
responsiveness of housing supply coupled with rises in households’ income increases the risk 
of a boom while for the risk of a bust this effect works through bank monitoring. Adverse 
demand shocks such as increases in structural unemployment, reduces overall volatility and 
more so the higher is the residential property tax.  
A separate model for price falls is tested against data through a forecasting exercise. The 
models’ ability to predict a bust is improved when we allow for interactions between 
determinants of demand and structural factors. At the eve of a bust, this model signal between 
.92 and 3.22 standard deviations higher risks in the housing market than the average or mean 
risk for 20 out of 22 episodes, and fails in 2 cases.  
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Still some questions remain. This analysis has been almost silent as to why, from the 
perspective of theory, there might exist nonlinearities over the housing cycle. It is also a 
debate whether house prices are predictable in the first place. The determinants of housing 
prices is a complex universe and one must deal with intractable interactions between shifting 
expectations, a battery of policy interventions, scarcity of land, the dual role of housing as an 
asset and a necessity and inventive mortgage markets, to name some. All models and 
estimations presented here are subject to such caveats.  
Going forward I would propose to develop richer models and employ more refined methods 
of dating procedures of housing cycles and advocate that efforts are put into high quality data 
for cross country determinants of the dynamics of housing prices.  
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Appendix  
Assumptions underlying the econometric modeling and tests 
 
The baseline model and extensions 
The first choice to make is whether to estimate the joint model consisting of the demand and 
supply or investment system. This is especially relevant if there is a close relationship 
between the two, and simultaneous equation methods will be appropriate. However, from the 
observed slow or insufficient degree of housing investments in many countries with respect to 
price changes as of making the housing market clear at current prices, since our scope is 
modelling short to medium term dynamics, it is theoretically plausible and fairly common 
practice to assume the demand side is most likely to drive prices given supply side factors 
such as the elasticity of supply. So we choose the inverted demand regression model aiming at 
the proper conditioning and functional form.  
The temporal dominance calls for methods that say more about the time series structure of the 
data. But since the panel aspect is likely also to matter, at a minimum, if choosing constant 
parameter values and joint estimation as opposed to finding parameter values for each country 
or allowing for heterogeneity more explicitly, we want to allow for some unobserved 
individual effects. The baseline unobserved effects regression model can be written generally, 
for a specific country-year-observation, as 
                       (   ) 
,where      is a scalar, the observed regressors       is (   )   ,the unobserved    is a 
scalar and                     as defined in section 4.  
According to Beck (2005), when data are annual, short lags of the AR (p)-process are often 
sufficient, while e.g. quarterly data would call for examination of higher order processes.  
Next we need to examine the nature of the unobserved effects. Fixed Effects (FE) and 
Random effects (RE) estimation rely on strict exogeneity of the idiosyncratic error conditional 
on the unobserved effect and all T regressor-vectors for consistency  (    |     )         
      , where                . For the within estimator used in the FE-case, because of 
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time demeaning we lose N=21 degrees of freedom. Both models are estimated using Statas 
“Xtregar”-function, which in short involves first transforming the data to remove the AR(1)-
component and then use the within-transformation to lose the fixed effect in the FE-case or 
use the Baltagi-Wu GLS estimator for the RE-case. Both estimation methods allow for 
unbalanced panels.   
Also note that A.1 is in fact a dynamic model (ADL with unobserved component) 
                                                 
 
                  (   )  
Hence we could instead use a lagged dependent variable (LDV) model with IID errors and 
thus make the dynamics part of the model. ; in the AR(1)-case we obtain different dynamics 
(impulse responses (IRF)) from the observed and unobserved parts of the model. The partial 
effect on prices from one of the observables will look like a spike, as in the static case, while 
the unobserved factors have a declining geometric IRF at rate  . The LDV has an IRF for 
both that has a declining geometric form. The distinction with the AR (1)-case is then that we 
assume the effects of all variables have impacts that die out exponentially, also the 
unobserved parts (Beck 2006).  
Subtract        from both sides of (   )  and add and subtract          from the RHS and get 
               (   )(         
 
      )             (   )  
The error correction model is popular in studying house price dynamics (E.g. Sanchez and 
Johansson 2011, Catte et al. 2004). As we have seen this model offers an interpretation of the 
long term equilibrium notion of house prices and short term fluctuations. However, in 
ordinary ECM estimations one loses the country specific heterogeneity. If we want to derive 
panel estimates, we need to make assumptions and suitable handle the    as discussed above 
in the FE or RE cases. Below are the long term levels estimates used to calculate the error 
correction term in (4.2) 
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                                                     Table A1 Long term estimates ECM model (4.2) 
  
Variables FE_model 
  
RDI 1.659*** 
 (0.0973) 
RDI ×Banksup. -0.00636** 
 (0.00285) 
RDI ×SupplyEl. -0.783*** 
 (0.0732) 
Pop. density 1.165*** 
 (0.157) 
Nairu -0.0213*** 
 (0.00662) 
CPI -0.00439 
 (0.00387) 
C. real rate -0.00292 
 (0.00352) 
New dwellings 0.177*** 
 (0.0251) 
Constant -0.0348*** 
 (0.00777) 
  
Observations 396 
R-squared 0.769 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The LDV version of A.1 is 
                                (   ) 
Estimating (   ) by fixed effects we must pay attention to potentially biased estimators. 
Under the WE-transformation (denoted by ¨), the lagged dependent variable become       ̈  
         
 
(   )
(         ), while the errors become    ̈        
 
(   )
(         )  
Since the        term in       ̈  correlates negatively with the 
  
(   )
       in    ̈  while, the 
  
(   )
    and     terms also moves together, the regressor and error are still correlated after 
transformation. But since T is quite large (37), the 
  
(   )
       and 
  
(   )
    terms tends to 
zero. Thus when using a lagged dependent variable, the FE-framework have some satisfactory 
asymptotic properties. Beck and Katz demonstrate this by running Monte Carlo experiments 
to compare OLS estimation of a TSCS model with lagged dependent variable and fixed 
effects to the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (IV-approach) with T > 20 and find that OLS 
outperform Anderson-Hsiao (Beck & Katz 2009).  
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The linear probability and logistic model 
Redefine the dependent variable in (1) as a binary variable. If we assume strict exogeneity of 
the errors, the conditional probability that y equals 1 is   (      | 
 
      )   (    | 
 
    
  ), that is the regression function. The most obvious problem of assuming linearity in a 
probabilistic measure is the possibility of obtaining values outside [   ] as we see in section 
5. Also, standard errors are generally heteroscedastic, and this should be corrected for by 
using standard errors robust to such heteroscedasticity (Cameron, Trivedi (2009)). It is 
however a straight forward approach to estimating marginal effects and allows for controlling 
for fixed effects. The saneness of the LPM ultimately boils down to whether or not the data 
generating process share the same properties, hence if boom-and bust-probabilities are linear 
in the parameters. 
The RE Logit model specifies that     (    
 )  and a standard logistic distribution for the 
individual error term. The margins command in Stata computes marginal effects at      for 
identification , and it should be checked whether this really is a representative evaluation 
point. Alternatively the margins must be interpreted with caution. The estimation is conducted 
using 20 integration points (the Stata default is 12). Since the response in this analysis is 
scewed to the left (more zeroes than ones), a complementary log-log model is also tested for. 
It turned out the log likelihood is -141 as well (-141 for both the probit and the logit model) 
and produced almost identical fitted probabilities for the case of US, so there is no trade-off 
here.  
Test of the integrated properties of log real house prices 
 
The model that is tested in the CMR AO-case is  
                       ∑   
 
   
          ∑    
 
   
            ̂      ∑   
 
   
 ̂        
,where    is log of real house prices in period t,                  and 0 otherwise, 
      captures the structural breaks and   is the unit root test-coefficient. Including lags of 
  ̂    allow for serial correlation up to a lag of 6 years
27
.  
 
                                                 
27
 The value of 6 years is chosen by looking at average length of cycles and then adding about a year. 
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Table A2 Test for unit roots with structural breaks’, AO-model. Critical value for (   ) t-stat is -5.49 
country Optimal 
breakpoints 
(   ) t Break 
1 
t p-
value  
Break 
2 
t p-value 
AUS 1990, 2004 -0.634 -4.74 0.398* 6.84 0.000 0.555* 7.83 0.000 
BLE 1991, 2002 -0.372 -3.09 0.303* 5.94 0.000 0.445* 7.72 0.000 
CAN 1990, 2003 -0.530 -3.18 0.095* 2.43 0.002 0.475* 10.46 0.000 
CHE 1987, 1994 -0.652 -3.17 0.24* 5.55 0.000 -0.24* -5.10 0.000 
DEU 1986, 2004 -0.564 -4.96 -0.09* -6.14 0.000 -0.14* -7.92 0.000 
DEN 1999, 2007 -0.515 -4.11 0.479* 8.16 0.000 0.086 1.05 0.302 
ESP 1992, 2006 -0.386 -5.15 0.514* 6.01 0.000 0.387* 3.31 0.002 
FIN 1987, 2001 -0.317 -3.70 0.191* 3.26 0.003 0.410* 6.70 0.000 
FRA 1992, 2007 -0.382 -4.00 0.297* 4.64 0.000 0.461* 4.87 0.000 
UK 1985, 2001 -0.825 -4.79 0.483* 9.64 0.000 0.696* 13.89 0.000 
IRL 1993, 2000 -0.678 -4.54 0.474* 6.09 0.000 0.709* 8.47 0.000 
JAP 1988, 2001 -0.251 -2.19 0.260* 6.25 0.000 -0.34* -7.73 0.000 
KOR 1995, 2004 -0.341 -3.27 -0.37* -6.87 0.000 0.106 1.59 0.120 
NED 1993, 2000 -0.457 -1.37 0.334* 4.48 0.000 0.455* 5.67 0.000 
NOR 1987, 2001 -0.435 -3.58 0.113 1.89 0.068 0.524* 8.34 0.000 
NZ 1998, 2006 -0.425 -4.51 0.467* 6.95 0.000 0.332* 3.74 0.001 
SWE 1983, 2002 -0.197 -3.44 -0.20* -3.44 0.002 0.562* 10.17 0.000 
USA 1979, 2007 -0.134 -1.75 0.182* 2.46 0.025 0.182* 2.45 0.026 
ZAF 1987, 2005 -0.689 -4.97 -0.35* -5.55 0.000 0.658* 8.50 0.000 
ITA 1990, 2004 -0.838 -4.64 0.195* 4.79 0.000 0.224* 4.56 0.000 
LUX 1991, 2003 -0.530 -4.33 0.522* 8.75 0.000 0.479* 6.86 0.000 
Composite 1992, 2007 -0.290 -4.17 0.158* 4.86 0.000 0.106* 2.21 0.034 
‘ the model used is Clemente-Montañés-Reyer (1998) unit root test with structural breaks. The null is that the 
series has a unit root with structural breaks against the alternative of stationarity with breaks. Structural breaks 
are treated as endogenous in the model. The AO-model captures a sudden change in the mean of the series from 
inspection of the graphs. The alternative within this framework would be the IO-model with gradual shifts.  
* indicates the structural breaks suggested by the test is significant at the 5 % level (which is all countries less 3). 
 
Real disposable income 
The Im-Peseran-Shin test tests the null that all countries log incomes have a unit root where 
the autoregressive parameter    is allowed to vary between countries against the alternative 
that some but not all have unit roots, and seem appropriate for our analysis.  
Table A3 Test statistic 
 
Including lags allow for serial correlation, the number of lags is determined by the AIC-method. We use 
demeaning to mitigate the effect of correlation in income between countries. The null of a unit root in all 
countries is not rejected at the 1 % level using this specification (t-stat is approximately standard normal under 
the null). The test require T grow larger than N sequentially. 
                                                                              
 W-t-bar             -0.3789        0.3524
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
ADF regressions: 1.91 lags average (chosen by AIC)
Time trend:   Not included                  Cross-sectional means removed
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels are stationary              Number of periods =     38
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =     22
                                         
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for lrdinc
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